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Abstract  
Motivated by recent debates on the possible role of wages as an income policy tool, 
in this study we examine the dynamic inter-relationship between wages in Bulgaria, 
mainly in the context of its EU accession. Relative to the WDN studies on the other 
EU member states, the novelty in this paper is the inclusion of the minimum wage 
as a possible conditional determinant of the other two wages. We demonstrate 
that minimum wage increases do not cause changes in average wages in either 
the government or the private sector. Using variety of  econometric tests, we also 
demonstrate the leadership of private sector wage over public  compensation and 
recommend the implementation of policy measures aimed at labor productivity 
growth.  
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Section 1: Introduction and Motivation
A major concern for economics is to understand how labour markets work  because 
roughly two-thirds of total income is classified as labour income. One such 
 aggregate aspect is the relationship between real public and private sector wages 
and the  causal links running between them. We focus on dynamic inter-relation-
ships, sectoral  spill-overs and transmission mechanisms. The issue of wage leader-
ship is further  relevant for both policy makers and central banks from analytical 
and  monetary  policy perspectives. So far, the literature has mostly neglected the 
dynamic  correlation between the two wages and no studies have included minimum 
wage together with the analysis of public and private wage dynamics. This is where 
the contribution of this paper lies.
 This paper analyses the co-movement and causality of public and private sector 
wages as well as the role of the minimum wage in Bulgarian economy for the period 
of 2000-2016. We chose this period, on the one hand, for the relative stability of the 
Bulgarian lev and, on the other, because of the 2007 Bulgarian accession to the EU. 
The first part of the study examines the causal effects between public and private 
sector wages in the context of existing literature. Most studies of EU countries, such 
as Lamo et al. (2008) point to a strong bi-directional causality and co-integration of 
both wages with the private sector, established as a leader in wage  determination. 
Our study adds to the existing knowledge by reporting one-directional causal 
 effects running from private over to public sector wages. In line with EU findings, 
we  conclude that the private sector is an established leader in wage determination 
and that its leadership is stronger than in some EU countries. Despite the presence 
of a large public sector as a major employer, both in Bulgaria and in the EU, it is the 
private sector that establishes itself as a leader in wage determination in the case of 
Bulgaria. We further derive the co-movement over the business cycle and establish 
that there is a tendency for long-term co-integration. The second part of the study 
focuses on the role of the minimum wage as a tool for income policy. We find no 
long-term causal effects of the minimum wage on private and public sector wages. 
This suggests that minimum wage plays no role in improving welfare, as raising it 
does not, in turn, raise average public and private sector wages. This finding is in 
line with the framework in the minimum wage study by Economides and Moutos 
(2016)1. 
 In our empirical analysis we use de-trended quarterly data to obtain a VAR model 
in a time-series context. Furthermore, we derive all empirical results, in both nomi-
nal and real terms, with CPI preferred as a main deflating tool. Results show that real 
1. Economides and Moutos (2016), discussed in Section 2, find that it is impossible for any level of 
minimum wage to increase incomes of employed workers and, this way, the authors prove the 
inefficiency of minimum wage as an income policy tool.
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public wages react to increases in private sector wages with a lag of half a year (two 
quarters). In addition, nominal public and private sector wages exhibit a  common 
trend and tendency for long-term co-integration. We use  Granger-causality Wald 
tests to show that the private sector is the leading one in wage determination and 
that minimum wage plays no role in the latter. Furthermore, applying impulse 
 response functions leads to the same conclusion as do the correlation coefficients 
between the wages and the Wald tests. The effect of real private wages on public 
and minimum ones is graphically presented to show that economic adjustments 
to shocks tend to follow two periods (quarters) of time. Half a year after a wage 
increase in the private (leading) sector, a public wage increase follows until long-
run equilibrium is reached. We further discuss some possible sources of the shocks 
that establish  private wage as the leader. Next, we delve into public and private wage 
determinants by considering several labour market models, such as perfect compe-
tition, monopsony and unions, search and matching frictions, efficiency wages and 
minimum wages. 
 The rest of the paper is organised as follows: section 2 reviews the literature, 
followed by section 3, which presents description of the data, some stylised facts 
on Bulgarian wages and the process of wage determination. Section 4 explains the 
methodology employed in analysing the data. We also include some limitations to 
our study, a policy recommendation in line with our findings, a venue for possible 
future research and conclusions under section 5.
Section 2: Literature Review
As pointed out in Lamo, et al. (2008), the literature on wage dynamics, spill-overs 
and leadership proves to be quite scarce. Furthermore, its focus falls on the rela-
tionship between public and private sector wages with the effect of the minimum 
wage, if such, studied separately. The few existing models, such as in Demekas’ and 
Kontolemis’ one (2000), generally assume a static relationship between public and 
private wages, where the public influences the private wage through the labour sup-
ply principle, i.e. increases in the public wage leave no choice for private businesses 
but to increase wages in the respective sector, as well.
 This direction of causality is reversed in the so-called Scandinavian model, as 
discussed in Jacobson et al. (1994), which finds that the sector more open to interna-
tional competition is the established wage leader. In the case of Sweden, the leader is 
the private sector, as it is found to have higher productivity growth. The competitive 
market theory, according to which wage increases run from the competitive to the 
protected sector, has been further elaborated by Lindquist et al. (2004), who find 
that the Swedish private sector Granger-causes the public one. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that, in the case for Sweden, Norway and Finland, it is the market forces 
that drive wage mechanisms in establishing causal links. However, apart from the 
two models above, there is no unified theoretical model, since findings tend to be 
heterogeneous across individual countries.
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 Not only theoretical models but also empirical results for most countries differ, 
so we primarily focus on literature concerning the Eastern European region and 
EU member states. It should be noted that one of the reasons for this  difference in 
wage dynamics may be attributed to the different institutional and wage  bargaining 
processes in place, as well as to the variety of approaches used in analysing the data 
available. We chose to follow an ECB study of wage interactions over the period 
1960-2006 for the Euro area, Euro area countries and a number of other OECD 
countries (Lamo et al., 2008), as our main references. This ECB study is was 
 undertaken by the Wage Dynamics Network (WDN), consisting of economists from 
the European Central Bank (ECB) and the National Central Banks (NCBs) of the 
EU Member States. The study uses a VAR model to find a strong  contemporaneous 
correlation between private and public wages over the business cycle, as well as a 
tendency  towards long-run co-movement. Furthermore, Lamo et al. (2008) find 
that causal links between the two nominal wages suggest that feedback occurs in a 
direct  manner, i.e. through prices. Despite institutional differences across countries, 
strong correlation and long-term co-integration are reported for the majority of the 
cases.
 In another study undertaken as part of the WDN, Afonso and Gomes (2010) ana-
lyse the interactions between public and private sector wages of OECD  countries for 
the period 1973-2000. Their study presents a two-sector system, public and  private, 
where the two wages are estimated by two different wage functions. The study 
 further tests the validity of variables as instruments affecting wage  determination. 
The econometric method used is a three-stage least-squares, an  estimation of the 
two wages and their determinants via a two-equation system. The study  reports that 
public sector wage growth is mainly driven by private sector wage  increases and the 
government fiscal condition. Besides, public wage growth is found to  positively  affect 
private wage increases. These results are driven by the validity of instruments used, 
such as total factor productivity, unemployment and urbanisation rates, growth rates 
of the average hours worked per employee and fiscal conditions.  However, there is 
no minimum wage present in the model.
 Christou (2007) obtains bi-variate VAR estimation on dynamic public and  private 
wage behaviour for the period 1993-2007. The study finds bi-directional  causality 
running between public and private wages. Moreover, the Romanian  economy 
can be regarded as similar to the Bulgarian one, since both countries gained EU 
 accession in 2008 and both share comparable institutional and economic settings. 
Despite the fact that in Romania government wages are higher, on average, and their 
sector share is growing faster (in line with most EU countries), private wages are 
found to equally influence public ones. Christou (2007) ignores minimum wages 
from the estimated VAR system. 
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 Another important paper in the wage dynamics literature relevant to our study 
is the study by Demekas and Kontolemis (1999), who find evidence of public wage 
leadership in VAR analysis for Greece (1971-1993). Demekas and Kontolemis (1999) 
also use a two-sector theoretical model to find that employment and wage  decisions 
in the public sector are fundamentally different from those in the private one due 
to the presence of political economy factors (employees are also voters and can 
be  patronised by the government) in the government sector. Moreover, the study 
 reports that increases in government wages lead to both increases in private-sector 
wages and higher unemployment. Empirical results indicate that the government 
sector’s decisions as an employer are important for understanding aggregate market 
settings and conclude that this effect of the public sector should not be taken as an 
absolute fact.
 In a very recent study, Vasilev (2015) uses data about Germany for the period 
1970–2007 to study the importance of public sector unions within an RBC  model, 
relevant for a number of EU member states. This is relevant to our research, as  Vasilev 
(2015) studies wage dynamics using a micro-founded general equilibrium model. 
The study also finds that both government wages and public employment share in-
crease at the expense of the private sector. Furthermore, the correlation found be-
tween public and private wages in Germany is less than perfect (0.5) but positive, 
providing some support for the moderate leadership of private sector wage over 
the public one. In a following paper on German data (1970-2007) in the context of 
EU-12 countries, Vasilev (2016) models the government sector as unproductive, or 
wasteful, with public and private wages jointly determined as endogenous  variables, 
once again. Furthermore, public wage determination is only slightly affected by the 
process of rent-seeking, but still mainly determined by the government’s balanced 
budget and households’ supply of labour in the public sector. Overall, Vasilev (2015, 
2016) studies public and private wage dynamics in a bi-directional relationship, but 
does not include minimum wage as a possible income policy tool. This is where we 
try to contribute with this study.
 Another relevant study is that by D’Adamo (2011), who uses a VAR  specification 
to analyze spill-over effects in wage determination for ten Eastern European 
 countries over the last decade. Since results are largely heterogeneous, across 
 different  countries, we focus on his VAR models for the two Bulgarian wages. The 
study adopts the theoretical framework of the Scandinavian model, where the 
 internationally traded sector is the leader for wage determination. D’Adamo (2011) 
finds that, for Bulgaria, the Industry (Traded) and Services (Non-Traded) sectors 
are wage leaders and that a weak version of the Scandinavian model applies for the 
country with the traded (private) sector established as a leader. D’Adamo’s (2011) 
results are also in line with our findings, where private wage exhibits even stronger 
causal leadership over the public one.
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 Similar to findings in the literature on minimum wage, there is plenty of discus-
sion on its efficiency as an income policy tool, but there is no systematic  approach2. 
The exception is a very recent study by Economides and Moutos (2016), who 
 incorporate minimum wage in a dynamic general model applicable to any coun-
try. In their model, workers and capitalists are the two main agents for minimum 
wage determination. Their study considers the case of perfect competition among 
firms, while public wages are missing from the model. The government is taken as 
an agent that imposes the minimum wage in addition to levying taxes. Economides 
and  Moutos (2016) find that it is impossible for any level of the minimum wage 
to increase  incomes of employed workers and that minimum wage is, therefore, 
 inefficient as an income policy tool. The reason behind this finding is the fact that 
minimum wage introduces inefficiency, since an artificially imposed wage ceiling 
reduces a firm’s profits. The cost of this inefficiency cannot be transferred to  anyone 
else but capitalists and this would result in decreasing returns to scale. Moreover, 
these analyses are in line with economic theory, which dictates that employers 
would choose to have fewer workers when a binding minimum wage is imposed on 
the economy.  
 Lastly, we explore the literature on Bulgarian wages. There are several surveys 
conducted as part of the WDN (Wage Dynamics Network), which examine wage 
rigidity and the main features of the wage-setting process for firms in Bulgaria. 
 Vladova (2012), Lozev et al. (2011), Loukanova (2011) and Paskaleva (2016) report 
a relatively weak wage-price link in the case of Bulgarian wages, suggesting that 
 labour cost growth is not fully in line with productivity growth. Besides, Loukanova 
(2011) finds that the minimum wage is not a push-up for the average one and that, 
in fact, it affects only wage values close to it. Lozev et al. (2011) and Paskaleva (2016) 
report that wage changes occur only once a year as compared to the eight-month 
price duration. The latest survey of Bulgarian wages, discussed in detail in the next 
section under stylised facts, finds that firms with minimum wage prevalence claim 
that economic uncertainty, high payroll taxes and changes in labour laws lead to 
lower employment of workers. 
Section 3: Data description and Stylised Facts
3.1 Data Description
We use data from the NSI (October 2016) database on Bulgarian CPI and wages. 
As data on nominal wages are reported on a monthly basis, we converted them 
into quarterly ones for easier modelling. We used NSI data on average earnings 
2. For example, see: Burkhauser R. and J. Sabia (2007), Economides G. and T. Moutos (2014, 
 Neumark D. and W. L. Wascher (2008).
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for government, private and minimum wages approximated as compensation per 
 employee. Compensation for all private sector employees is defined as  compensation 
of all  employees minus compensation of government employees in the  Bulgarian 
economy. Compensation per private sector employee is then computed by  taking 
the private compensation of employees, divided by private sector employees  minus 
government employment minus self-employment, as in Lamo et al. (2008). The 
rest of this section provides a detailed explanation on how wage determination 
 mechanisms work in Bulgaria.
 Regarding wage measurement, we have taken compensation per employee both 
in real and nominal terms for the period 2000-2016. We use CPI as a main price 
 deflator to obtain real wages, with all specifications conducted in a  time-series 
 context. The driving force behind deflating wages is to exclude possible shocks and 
minimise the possibility for spurious outcomes when modelling wage  relations. 
Figure 1, below, shows that wages seem to share a linear trend, which may also 
indicate the presence of non-stationarity, co-movement and possible long-term 
 co-integration.
 As evidenced from Figure 1 on the next page, the 2008 economic crisis led to 
private wage decreases and higher unemployment rates. During this period the 
gap between private and public wages was the highest and lasted until the end of 
2010, when the economy experienced some positive growth. At the beginning of 
2011, the private wage was again closely co-moving with the public one. After a few 
years of adjustment, the two wages have nearly converged (2016). To show that our 
 results are not an artefact of inflation, real wages in Figure 2 below are shown to have 
 similar co-movement and trend over the period studied.
Figure 1. Nominal Wages Movement
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Figure 2. Real Wages Movement
The increase in government sector wages during the crisis suggests poor  adaptability 
of wages to economic performance, as also pointed out by Loukanova (2011). 
Moreover, as employment decreased, many low-skilled workers were laid off 
 (approximately 20% according to Loukanova (2011)) which lead to increases in 
 average wage. The latter hints that the government budget deficit was not handled 
very well during that period, as it indicates lower economic efficiency and produc-
tivity. Furthermore, productivity increased in the period after the crisis (2011), but 
wage growth was slower and real wages actually decreased.
3.2 Public and Private Wage Determination
First, as shown in Figure 1 above, public sector wages are consistently higher than 
private ones for the period studied (2000-2016). This is particularly important in the 
context of EU government spending on labour, since the latter has been increasing 
in many European countries over the past years, as pointed out by Afonso (2008). 
Moreover, as documented by Vasilev (2015), the increase in the public wage bill, 
as evidenced in the post-World War II period together with the increase in public 
 sector employment have led to a higher share captured by the public output for 
 selected EU member states.
 As for Bulgaria, there are several forces behind wage determination. The main 
factors for public and private wage formation are the legislation system and  collective 
bargaining forces acting in accordance with budget constraints. Wage  setting is 
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 determined through the so-called Tripartite Cooperation bargaining, comprising 
government representatives, business employers and unions, as documented by 
Nenovsky and Koleva (2001). Further, collective wage bargaining can be differen-
tiated at two levels: sector and company. Companies set their wages according to 
profit constraints, which, in turn, limit the rigidity of labour unions in the private 
sector. Since firms are profit-oriented, unions cannot ask for excessively high wages, 
or else the firm would not be able to afford such costs and would eventually close 
down. The other possible reason for lower private sector wages may lie in monop-
sonies existing in certain sectors. Many firms in Bulgaria were privatised and, as a 
result, they can now be viewed as a single regional employer, which would allow for 
setting lower wages and creating an envelope wage practice.  
 Moreover, collective bargaining in Bulgaria is mostly characteristic at the firm 
rather than the industry level, with most companies following their own price  setting. 
This makes the exact determination of private wages more difficult,  contributing to 
the weak price-wage link. Firms that faced worsened economic  conditions imple-
mented reduced flexible wage components and wage cuts in the private  sector. The 
2009-2013 period was marked by deterioration in demand and worsened  customer 
ability to pay (Lozev et al., 2011), which are factors connected to wage rigidity.  Survey 
results show that wage changes occur in approximately 27 months for the above pe-
riod, a figure relatively low for the EU (Paskaleva, 2016). The main  reason behind it 
is that firms reported a preference for wage freezes rather than wage changes, which 
can be taken as yet another explanation for the weak wage-price link in Bulgaria. All 
of these reasons can be viewed as influences on real wages, as well as on their slower 
growth and change frequency, for the last couple of years (Paskaleva, 2016).
 Rose (1985) notes that public employees depend on private sector employees, 
since taxes generated in private sector activities account for the revenues paying 
the salaries of most public employees. Direct comparison between the two sectors 
is not possible, for various reasons. First, the output of the two is not  comparable, 
since it cannot be measured in monetary terms. Next, productivity cannot be ful-
ly captured, as some public goods are more labour-intensive than others and the 
 working time of employees in the public sector differs from that in the private sector. 
Furthermore, according to Rose (1985), having higher public wages can be viewed 
as somewhat counterintuitive because there should be a trade-off between higher 
level of job  security, the benefits provided by the government and the level of wages. 
However, this is not the case, since public employees receive better compensation 
than private ones, despite the fact that private wage earners face higher taxes and 
lower job  security. Having higher public wages than economic principles dictate 
can be an  indicator of the presence of political economy. It should be noted that 
 government employees are also voters and enjoy higher labour union protection 
than their  private sector counterparts. 
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 One way to look at wage settings, as pointed by Vasilev (2015), is that private 
 sector wage is determined within a competitive market framework, while public 
sector wages could be viewed as a solution to a bargaining process between unions 
and the government. This means that, when there are government funds available, 
labour unions in the public sector would ask for higher wages, as they have greater 
bargaining power than their private sector counterparts. This is due to the lack of 
profit motive in government administration, together with the fact that the govern-
ment may start running budget deficits, as opposed to profit-maximising firms in 
the private sector. As a result, the government wage tends to be higher than the 
public sector wage. 
3.3 Minimum Wage Determination
There has been a mandatory minimum wage in Bulgaria since 1990. Its scale is 
 determined as a nominal value per month and hour and has been further  calibrated 
according to the poverty line level introduced in 2007. As documented by  Loukanova 
(2011), the minimum wage was introduced due to the strong bargaining power of 
trade unions, which argued in favour of protection of low-income workers and of 
establishing a basic standard of living.
 In practice, however, there are no long-term effects of minimum wage as its 
 increases are not in line with the slow rise observed in labour productivity. Every 
subsequent minimum wage increase can be shown to raise the bar for marginal 
worker productivity, which, in turn, forces firms to seek more productive workers, 
as pointed out by Loukanova (2011). Therefore, it can be argued that the  minimum 
wage practice may actually hurt low-skilled workers despite its initial purpose 
to  provide protection for them. Currently, the minimum wage is 420  Bulgarian 
leva (EUR 214.74) and is expected to reach approximately EUR 230 in 2017. The 
 government has been steadily increasing the minimum wage over the past few 
years (see  Figure 1 above) which, however, has not been effective in narrowing the 
gap between  minimum and average wage. Therefore, if wages are driven by labour 
 productivity in a competitive setting, minimum wage increases would have no effect 
in raising the overall standard of living.
Section 4: Methodology
4.1 Unit Root Tests
In this section we focus on the co-movement and causality effects of the public, 
 private and minimum nominal and real wages. We use a vector autoregressive 
(VAR) model of the three wages, suited for analysis of short-, medium- and long-run 
 correlations at different forecast horizons. The VAR model is a tool to study dynamic 
inter-relationships between variables. As in Lamo, et al. (2008), we use den Haan’s 
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methodology (2000), which can be applied to both stationary and non-stationary 
variables. We use the non-stationary method in obtaining long-term co-movement 
specifications and the stationary (de-trended) series for the Granger causality tests 
and impulse-response functions. Moreover, Dickey-Fuller (1979) and Phillips-Per-
ron (1988) unit root tests confirm the need for de-trending and the existence of a 
single unit root. We, also, further use Breusch-Godfrey (1978) and Durbin-Watson 
(1951) tests for serial correlation, as discussed in section 4.3.
 In our case, the de-trending process applied takes out the deterministic trend 
component and filters data for seasonal disturbances and cyclical adjustments. 
The empirical literature on the issue, such as Lamo et al., (2008) applies different 
types of de-trending methods and filters for the sake of obtaining a non-spurious 
 econometric specification. We, however, focus primarily on using the Hodrick-
Prescott (1997) filter, complemented by removal of the seasonal component to 
 de-trend variables. The underlying assumption is that data are integrated at order 
one (I1), i.e. the variables contain a unit root as well as a seasonal component which 
fluctuates around a deterministic trend, both of which become inert when the series 
are de-trended. As for the forecast horizon, we use a period of ten quarters to obtain 
impulse-response functions in the short-run. 
 We test for unit root at 5% significance using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test 
with four lags. As evidenced from Table 1 below, nominal private wages  display 
a unit root – the high Mackinnon value of 0.4423 indicates the series are not 
 stationary. There are also a trend and a drift present. Therefore, as Figure 1 in the 
previous section suggests, we need to seasonally adjust the series in order to account 
for the difference in private sector salaries during different seasons. To smooth the 
series, we seasonally adjust them and apply a Hodrick-Prescott filter for the cyclical 
 component, resulting in stationary variables. This procedure is equivalent to first-dif-
ferencing, which we apply as an alternative method to account for non-stationarity. 
The results show that the series are first-difference stationary, or I1. 
 After removing the seasonal component from the nominal public wage, the 
 results point at the presence of a unit root and a drift (initially, as shown in Table 1, 
there is no unit root prior to seasonal adjustment of the data); therefore, we also ap-
ply the Hodrick-Prescott filter to smoothen data. Regarding the minimum wage, its 
significant unit root is accounted for in the same manner of de-trending and, as ex-
pected, there is no trend present. The reason for this is that changes in the  minimum 
wage occur more rarely and thus are not subject to seasonal disturbances as often 
as the private and public sector wages are. In order to account for possible spurious 
 results, we also apply the Phillips-Perron unit root test and obtain the same or similar 
results. After removing the unit root component, the variables display a Mackinnon 
p-value close to zero, no trend and a constant factor. We also apply first-differencing 
and obtain a Mackinnon value of 0.000 and, therefore,  account for the presence of 
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the single unit root in each variable. The second part of the  table displays wages in 
real terms, which bring about similar outcomes3. The same  procedure of  accounting 
for the unit root is implemented. The difference here is that the minimum wage 
displays a significant trend, which is smoothened by the Hodrick-Prescott filter, as 
standard procedure suggests. 
Table 1. Unit Root Tests in Levels
4.2 Co-integration
Following standard practice, as in Lamo et al. (2008), we measure long-term 
 co-movement using the cross-correlation functions for the three  non-stationary 
wages. We use de-trended (stationary) series for obtaining the correlation 
 coefficients and the short-run co-movement and causality results. In short, the 
only tests for which we do not use de-trended variables are the co-movement and 
co-integration tests, since establishing long-run links requires the variables to be 
non-stationary, as documented in den Haan (2000). The reverse methodology is 
3. For unit root tests in logs, refer to Appendix A.
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applied in the  Granger-causality series of Wald tests, correlation relationships and 
impulse-response functions, where data are required to be stationary and, therefore, 
de-trended. Our findings in Table 1 on the previous page and Table 2 below are in 
line with stationarity tests performed by D’Adamo (2011) for Bulgaria and several 
East European countries (particularly Romania), which also confirm the presence of 
a unit root and exactly one long-term co-integrating equation for public and private 
wages. Test estimations show that the number of optimal lags to be used is four, as 
expected by the quarterly nature of the data. We used Akaike, Schwarz and Hannan-
Quinn (1979) information criteria in determining the number of optimal lags. 
Table 2. Selection Criteria for Optimal Lag Number
Table 3 below summarises the results obtained from a Johansen co-integration test. 
There is a single co-integration equation between public and private sector wages, as 
confirmed by D’Adamo (2011). We also run co-integration tests on minimum wages 
with the other two and obtain no co-integrating relationship in either case.  
Table 3. Johansen test for Co-integration
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4.3 Correlation
In this subsection, we focus on the correlation of the three wages. Table 4  summarises 
the results at both level and log forms. Each row displays the correlation coefficients 
between the three variables, obtained by using a model of differenced and seasonally 
adjusted wages at time t and t-k (k stands for the number of lags). Since our model 
is derived by using quarterly data and because rank tests show that the number of 
optimal lags is four, we trace the correlation relations for four periods. The first 
 output table reports nominal compensation per employee and the second displays 
real compensation as deflated by the CPI.
Table 4. Nominal Compensation Correlation
Following common practice on wage dynamics, as in Lamo et al. (2008), we base our 
analysis on the evidence that two variables are said to co-move in the same direction 
if the absolute maximum value of the coefficient estimated is positive. Furthermore, 
the variables move in opposite directions if the coefficient of the same de-trended 
series is negative and they do not co-move if the coefficient is close to zero. Again 
in line with Lamo et al. (2008), we take values between 0.30-0.39 as an evidence of 
weak to moderate correlation and values above 0.40 as evidence of strong  correlation 
in absolute terms.
Table 5. Real Compensation Correlation
In both cases, the variables are filtered using Hodrick-Prescott filter (1997) to 
 account for seasonal and cyclical components. Table 4 presents the coefficients in 
nominal terms; an asterisk (*) marks the highest correlation coefficient, which is 
observed to be at a lag of 2 periods both in level (0.5445) and in log (0.4492) terms. 
We regard these values as an indicator of a strong correlation between public and 
private wages in nominal terms. 
 Table 5 presents data for nominal wages deflated by CPI, where we derive similar 
outcomes. The strongest correlation occurs at zero lag, whereas a moderate one can 
be observed at lag 2 for level forms and at lag -4 for logs. The negative correlation 
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implied by the latter is, however, insufficient evidence against the general positive 
co-movement of wages, since its value is inclined more towards the weak toward a 
moderate wage relation and, furthermore, it occurs at only one value. Therefore, we 
regard the stronger and more persistent positive correlation as a sign of co-move-
ment and causal relationship between wages. We explain these causality links in the 
following sub-section. 
4.4 Empirical Results: VAR Model. Causality
One of the most preferred methods for establishing causal relationship in  empirical 
analysis and literature is that proposed by Granger (1969), which states that a  variable 
X is said to Granger-cause another variable (Y) if it provides statistically  significant 
information about Y. We consider a result to be statistically significant at the 5% 
level of significance for all tests. In this section we use Granger’s (1969) definition of 
causality for establishing causal links between public, private and minimum wages. 
Next, we use impulse-response functions to compare results and further evaluate 
causality links. Following the ECB study on wage dynamics by Lamo et al. (2008), 
we use VAR or vector autoregressive systems and Wald tests for public and private 
wage causality and extend the study to additionally incorporate  minimum  wages. 
The wage variables included in the VAR model are de-trended and filtered for 
 cyclical and seasonal components to account for the existing trend and for possible 
spurious results.  
 The following equation captures public, private and minimum wages of the VAR 
model. C is a vector of constant factors and A is a 3x3 matrix which contains all 
VAR coefficients of variables of lag from 1 to p. Wp, Wg, , Wmin  denote nominal 
 private, government and minimum wages and εt are all possible influences outside 
the model.
 Table 6 on the next page displays statistical outcomes of simple probability tests 
on nominal wages4. The table should be read as follows: the excluded variable is the 
estimator which causes the equation variable at 5% level of significance. Only the 
real private wage causing the public one has a significant p-value coefficient; all other 
Wald test probabilities are found to be insignificant. Additionally, the real minimum 
wage is shown to have no effect on either real public or private wages. Its highly 
insignificant coefficient values raise the issue of possible policy  recommendations 
discussed in the next section.   
 As evidenced from the Wald tests, the dominant pattern for all possible  testing 
adjustments is for private wages to lead public sector developments over the  business 
cycle. Nominal wages show similar results to those displayed for both log and lev-
el forms. When prices are accounted for, there is a 0.07 probability for the level 
4. Correlation data and coefficients on real wages can be found in Appendix B.
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forms of real private wages causing public ones. Given that we take a 5% level of 
significance, the case of real wages in levels is the only one where we can reject the 
 hypothesis that private wages cause public ones. As for the tests at logs, the causality 
running from private to public compensation is, again, highly significant (0.002), as 
shown in Table 6 below.
4.5 Impulse-Response Functions
In this section we analyse the Impulse-Response Functions obtained after running 
a VAR model. An IRF indicates the impact of an unanticipated one-unit change 
in the ‘impulse’ variable and the effect it has (if any) on the ‘response’ variable. In 
general, IRF functions are used for determining whether one variable is capable of 
 forecasting another over a specified time horizon. Furthermore, IRFs capture the 
 reaction of a dynamic system in response to some external change; in our context 
they capture how adjustments in one wage affect the other wages. In line with the 
ECB study on wage dynamics by Lamo et al. (2008), we took the results of the dif-
ferenced, i.e. stationary, level series as the ones most suitable for analysing. We also 
include real-wage IRFs, where variables are de-trended by CPI to determine the 
long-run effect of actual price influence5. We also take prices explicitly to obtain the 
impulse of CPI to nominal wages and the feedback that occurs.
Table 6. Real Wage Granger Causality in Logs
Next, after fitting a VAR model, we estimate the Forecast Error Variance Decom-
position (FEVD). FEVDs are used to determine how much of the forecast error 
variance of each variable is explained by exogenous shocks to other variables in the 
VAR. In short, FEVDs measure the relative importance of each shock or innovation 
that influences the respective wage. After trying different time horizons, we chose 12 
forecast periods as sufficient to explain the shocks affecting wages. 
5. Results on nominal wage IRFs and real and nominal FEVD tables can be found in Appendix C.
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 The last panel of Figure 3 on the next page shows the IRF of real private over 
public wages. This is the most significant graph in our study, since it confirms the 
results previously obtained from the Wald tests, namely that public wages respond 
to changes in private wages with a lag of approximately two (to two and a half) 
quarters. The first plot shows that a shock of real private wage to itself raises it, but 
quickly dies out and over time reaches zero. As for the shock of private on minimum 
wage, it can be disregarded as having no statistically significant effect. The last panel 
focuses on the impact the private wage shock has on the public wage; the shock 
starts from zero and reaches its peak in the second period, i.e. two quarters after the 
initial change. This means that public wages are affected by changes in the private 
wage with a delay of half a year. 
Figure 3. Private Real Wages
The source of this shock, epsilon private, can be attributed to the increase in inno-
vations and productivity (TFP) associated with the private sector. This explanation 
is consistent with the main theoretical models in labour literature6, where the wage 
rate is determined as an outcome of the bargaining process between workers and the 
firm. In this case, wage is considered to be proportionate not only to labour produc-
tivity, but also to the marginal rate of substitution and, more specifically, the shock 
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could be driven by factors other than technological innovation, such as change in 
taste or leisure preferences or shocks to alternative income (changes in productivity 
in the non-market sector).
 Similar reasoning for the case of real public wage in Figure 4 below shows that, as 
expected, at step zero, public wage increases by one unit and then slowly  decreases 
to zero. In addition, a public wage shock has no statistically significant effect on 
minimum wages. Furthermore, the last plot in the figure shows that the response of 
the private wage has a higher coefficient but remains negligible. This shock can be 
 attributed to policies such as an unexpectedly high tax revenue or drop in  other costs, 
e.g., lower demand for public services, etc. Lastly, government policies of changing 
public wages do not have any noticeable effect on increases in private  wages. The 
response in public sector wages is consistent with setups where wages are decided 
based on availability of government funds.
Figure 4. Real Public Wage
6. Discussions on possible models as explanations to epsilon public, private and minimum can be 
found in Appendix D.
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 Next, we study the effect of minimum wages on the other two wages. As shown 
in Figure 5 below, real minimum wage shocks have no long term effects on any 
of the three variables. This result shows that real minimum wage is still lagging 
 behind  productivity growth. Nominal minimum wages also display similar  results 
to  changes. Therefore, it can be concluded that the recent government policy of 
 increasing the minimum wage in order to narrow the gap between minimum and 
average Bulgarian wages is of no substantial effect; the weak or overall lacking 
 response elicited from the two sector wages is negligible over the one-year period 
shown. Furthermore, epsilon minimum, or the source of the shock, captures the 
 effect of innovation of minimum wage to minimum wage, i.e., government policies 
aimed at wage increases. This may be used as an instrument to lower the percentage 
of grey economy, but results show that it is not effective as an income policy tool. A 
 possible explanation is the prevalence of ‘envelope’ money (people declare  minimum 
wage as an official income, but at the same time do not declare all income), which 
 diminishes the possible effect of the minimum wage. 
Figure 5. Real Minimum Wage
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 When we take the shock of CPI to nominal private, public and minimum wages, 
there is little feedback from them over a one-year period, as evidenced from Figure 
6 below. The price shock to nominal private wages gets a statistically insignificant 
 response for the first quarter and eventually dies out in the next period. The feed-
back from public and minimum wage is even more negligible, which indicates that 
CPI has no effect in the short run (4 quarters). Price-wage link in Bulgaria is, there-
fore, weaker when compared to other EU countries and wage changes in response to 
inflation are not as quick to occur, as documented by Lozev et al. (2011). 
 Wage stickiness may play an important role in price adjustment, which implies 
that wages in Bulgaria are changed mainly for reasons not linked to inflation (e.g., 
length of service). Furthermore, Vladova (2012) finds evidence from surveys indi-
cating that only 27% of the firms in Bulgaria take into consideration the  connection 
between prices and wages, as compared to 40% in the EU. Therefore, it can be 
 concluded that price-driven wage changes are not common in the case of Bulgaria.
Figure 6. CPI on Nominal Wages
A possible explanation behind the shocks for the private, public and minimum 
 wages is that they could be driven by monetary policy shocks. These shocks are a de 
facto increase in monetary base, or an increase in the circulation and reserve  money, 
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which can beneficially affect wages. An example of a one-time monetary shock that 
might lead to public wage increase is the 2016 budget surplus of 1.6 billion  (Reuters). 
Moreover, Bulgaria is targeting a 1.4% deficit of GDP in 2017, which is expected to 
induce higher spending, possibly positively affecting labour costs as well (Reuters). 
Foreign inflows in Euro could also increase money supply (M2) when converted to 
BGN, in line with the 1.955 fixed exchange rate. Another example of foreign  inflows 
are foreigners’ time deposits, such as foreigners depositing their money or receiv-
ing their pensions through Bulgarian banks, etc. A factor beneficial to wages might 
be lowering the main interest rate, which was lastly recorded as 0% and has been 
close to zero since 2010 (BNB). The lower interest rate also attracts international 
 companies and higher investment, which could be taken as a positive shock to nom-
inal wages.
 An oil price shock could be one factor affecting changes in private wages. The 
Bulgarian industry is energy-intensive and lower oil prices, as in 2016, can result 
in a positive shock to private wages. Since total costs would fall, capital and labour 
would be affected through the demand channel. Increased demand for cheaper 
oil would lead to lower labour costs and positively affect wages. A decrease in oil 
prices may, in addition, influence public wages by affecting wages in public utility 
 companies. Another positive private wage shock is a possible trade shock, based 
on the  export-led growth resulting from Bulgaria’s accession to the EU in 2007. 
Many private  businesses took advantage of the open EU borders and expanded their 
production  beyond country-level, which generally results in a positive impact on 
 private sector wages.  In addition, the lower corporate tax rate (10% as of 2008) 
could also induce a positive wage shock, increasing the value of after-tax “surplus”, 
divided between labour and profit income.
 Minimum wage shocks could be the result of a positive shock to laziness, or the 
decreased preference to work. A shock to laziness, or relative preference for leisure, 
would trigger a substitution away from official work and towards either collecting 
benefits or transfers, or working in the grey economy. Further, receiving minimum 
wage also comes with children benefits, which can be a factor attractive to  mothers. 
Other types of transfers that can induce this substitution effect are food vouchers, 
unemployment benefits, housing subsidies, transfers in kind (heating vouchers, 
electricity or other types of vouchers), etc. Another factor could be a shock to invest-
ment technology, such as higher inventory or lower installation costs. With more 
capital used, labour is more productive, so wages also increase. Next, a shock to ca-
pacity of input utilisation, i.e. capital and labour or elasticity of substitution  between 
labour and consumption can also have an effect on wages. Alternative sources of 
income or consumption, such as home production, may increase consumption or 
lead to higher income. These shocks are all some possible explanations for our IRF 
results documented above.
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Section 5: Conclusion, Limitations of the Study and Future Research
This paper studies the relationship between public, private and minimum wages in 
Bulgaria. It reports a strong correlation between public and private wages and finds 
further evidence of co-movement and long-term co-integration. Next, it demon-
strates that causality runs from private to public wages and presents the implications 
from this finding. The study also focuses on policy recommendations based on these 
empirical results and reviews several labour models as possible explanations of the 
findings. What is new is the inclusion of minimum wage in the model and this is 
a contribution to existing literature. We report no causal relationship from mini-
mum wages to public and private ones. This finding is important from a policy per-
spective since it poses the question whether minimum wage is relevant as a policy 
making tool. We conduct series of Granger-causality Wald tests on quarterly data 
and  construct impulse-response functions to find the relationship and causal links 
between wages. In order to avoid spurious results, we use seasonally and cyclically 
adjusted variables after de-trending them. We consider both level and log forms to 
conduct our study and further use CPI as a main deflator in obtaining real wages. 
Following Lamo et al. (2008), we include CPI in the VAR with nominal wages to 
study possible price-wage linkages.
 Next, we will consider some limitations of our study. This paper’s added value 
is the inclusion of a minimum wage as an income policy tool in the private and 
 public sector wage dynamics.  We discuss some possible explanations for our 
 findings in the Appendix, but it is outside the scope of our study to consider a fully 
 specified  model. Our focus is wage leadership and causality in terms of one variable 
 forecasting  another. Therefore, what we do not include is a theoretical model that 
would provide a deeper understanding of wage determination mechanisms. 
 This limitation opens venues for future research, as it would be extremely 
 interesting to delve into the disciplined theoretical approach of Bulgarian wage 
 dynamics. The current study can be extended to a micro-founded model to explore 
how wages change over time, rather than taking them in a Walrasian static equilib-
rium context. An interesting path to follow would be to specify a dynamic stochastic 
general equilibrium (DSGE) model based on optimisation and rational behaviour.
 Finally, in the light of these results, we recommend implementing policies aimed 
at total factor productivity increases in the private sector to stimulate its growth and, 
consequently, growth in the public sector. Furthermore, this would strengthen the 
otherwise weak link between wages and labour productivity. Lastly, in the light of 
our findings, we recommend less reliance on minimum wage as an income policy 
tool.
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Appendix A
Section 4: Unit Root data on Log Forms
Table 1.2 Unit Root Tests on Wages in Logs
Section 4: VAR statistics
The tables on the next two pages should be read as follows:
PW – Private Wage
PU – Public Wage
MIN W. – Minimum Wage
L1 – First Lag L2 – Second Lag
Coeff. – Coefficient (alpha) 
SE – Standard Error 
 The VAR tables display the regression outcome of each dependent variable on 
lags of itself and lags of all other dependent variables (wages).
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Table 7. VAR for Nominal Wages in Levels Table 8. VAR for Nominal Wages in Logs
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Table 9. VAR for Real Wages in Levels  Table 10. VAR for Real Wages in Logs
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Section 4: Granger-causality tests
Table 6.1 Nominal wages in level forms   
Table 6.2 Nominal wages in log forms
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Table 6.3 Real-term wages in level forms
Appendix C
Nominal Impulse-Response Functions:
Figure 9. Nominal Private Wages
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Figure 10. Nominal Public Wages
Figure 11. Nominal Minimum Wage
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FEVD (Forecast Error Variance Decomposition)
Table 111. FEVD Nominal Private and Real Private Wage
Table112. FEVD Nominal Public and Real Public Wage
Table113. FEVD Nominal Minimum and Real Minimum Wage
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Appendix D
In this part of the Appendix we analyse several labour market models in the context 
of our findings. These models can rationalise the wage dynamics observed and their 
response to shocks as documented with impulse-response functions. We analyse 
labour market models for the private and public sector separately.
Private Sector
Perfect Competition
Perfect competition models assume that, in equilibrium, wages equal the marginal 
product of labour (MPL) on the firm side. Some of the aspects of the model  suppose 
that everyone has perfect information on prices and that firms have limited  market 
power in influencing prices and wages, i.e. firms are small and non-influential. 
 Perfect observability is another assumption of the model. On the consumer side, 
wage equals the marginal utility MU of labour. Another aspect is the idea of free 
entry and exit of firms, as well as their ability to adopt technology without any cost 
incursions. The perfect competition model is particularly useful in its  capacity to 
measure output and effort, something not as easily captured in the cases below. 
 Despite being unrealistic, this restrictive model is a useful starting point when 
 studying labour markets.
Monopsonies
In the general model, monopsonies, or single buyers of labour, have the purpose 
of maximising profits. In order to do that, employers would offer wages below the 
competitive equilibrium as compared to that of perfect competition. Paying a lower 
wage also means that the wage is below MPL, because monopsonists hire  according 
to the marginal cost MC and not the labour supply curve. If a monopsonist hires 
a marginal worker at a higher wage, s/he needs to increase the wages of all those 
hired  previously. In equilibrium, a monopolist employs fewer people and pays  lower 
 wages. This, combined with the limited power of labour unions in the private  sector 
(as pointed out in section 3), is a plausible explanation of the lower private  sector 
wages in Bulgaria. Furthermore, data on Bulgaria show little mobility between 
 regions (NSI 2016). Therefore, this model is credible if we assume that little labour 
mobility holds; if a monopsony pays less than the market-clearing wage, it is  natural 
that workers would change jobs. Additionally, state-owned monopsonies were 
 privatised in the 1990s, which resulted in forming regional monopsonies  capable of 
keeping wages artificially lower. 
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Unions
In general, labour unions bargain for higher wages or better working conditions 
for workers. As discussed previously, in Section 3, private sector labour unions 
can be viewed as having limited power, since their demands are constrained when 
 bargaining for wages higher than the marginal product in a profit-maximising 
firm. Unions can achieve wages greater than MPL, for instance, at the expense of 
decreasing the share of capital income; however, this will still be within the prof-
it  constraint in order to avoid bankruptcy. In the presence of monopsony, unions 
 playing the same role as minimum wage mitigate the excessive monpsonistic power, 
as  documented by Boeri and Ours (2008), which means that unions would not allow 
monopsonies to pay workers below a minimum or a set wage. However, unions have 
limited  potential to explain labour market dynamics in Bulgaria.
Search and Matching
In this model, we consider a labour market with search and matching  frictions. Such 
frictions are primarily the result of having imperfect information or  information 
asymmetry in the labour market. Search and matching frictions  generate  externalities, 
since it takes time for jobseekers to be matched to a position. In this  non-Walrasian 
model, equilibrium is determined by the demand side, while the number of  people 
hired is determined by the labour quantity demanded. This model could, in 
 addition, account for the presence of an involuntary level of unemployment. Fur-
thermore,  individuals might not always take the prevailing wage, while finding the 
best match is often a long and costly process, in terms of both time and resources. 
 Another  possibility that accounts for the persisting level of  unemployment might 
be that individual workers differ in terms of skills/competences and it may often be 
difficult to find a perfect match. Therefore, search and matching frictions seem to be 
 quantitatively important in explaining labour market dynamics in Bulgaria.
Efficiency Wages
Efficiency wages in labour economics denote the tendency of some employers to 
pay more than the market-clearing wage in order to encourage higher productivity. 
 Efficiency wages are often used as a ‘gift exchange’, where the employer pays higher 
than the equilibrium wage in order to induce more effort from the worker. Such wages 
can also be viewed an incentive for semi-skilled and skilled labour. This  model could 
also explain the disparity between public and private wages in the  context of real 
 rigidities. Rigidities are prices or wages that do not adjust to the expected  equilibrium 
level in response to changes in other prices or wages.  Additionally, if  private sec-
tor wages are seen as rigid, they may change only in  response to  technological 
shocks and account for the percentage of existing  involuntary  unemployment. 
124 A. VASILEV, H. MANOLOVA , South-Eastern Europe Journal of Economics 1 (2019) 91-127
Therefore, this would explain the lower private sector wage, which fails to adjust to 
wage  increases in the public sector. Another  explanation for the disparity may be 
the  practice of ‘envelope’ wages by some employers who prefer to complement the 
 officially  documented wage with undeclared cash  compensation.  Furthermore, real 
rigidities and efficiency wages imply that a  worker’s effort depends on the real wage 
and to maximise profit, firms choose the real wage that would  induce the  highest 
effort on the part of workers. However, we also discussed the weak price-wage link, 
pointed out by Vladova (2016), which means that real wages do not adjust as often as 
prices change. Finally, efficiency wages can also potentially explain wage  dynamics 
in Bulgaria.
Minimum Wages
The minimum wage model may be applied to attract people from the grey  economy, 
especially when the percentage of the latter is too high in the overall economic 
 activity. A minimum wage can, in this sense, be viewed as an efficiency wage that 
aims to deter people from shifting to the grey sector by offering an incentive to seek 
a job in the private sector. Another possible explanation is that a minimum wage is 
used to increase labour productivity. However, as productivity is difficult and, often, 
costly to measure and monitor, it is not always clear whether a  minimum wage is an 
effective tool for increasing productivity. Moreover, the higher the minimum wage, 
the stronger a company’s incentive to either fire workers or use ‘envelope’ wages, 
which is counter-productive. According to the National Revenue Agency (NRI), 
one-third of the Bulgarian working population declared working for the mini-
mum wage in 2016. Besides, recent increases in minimum wage are not in line with 
 productivity increases, again according to IME (2015) information. 
We can also express the models of private wage with a Nash bargaining equation:
...................................,
where .... is the bargaining weight of the firm multiplied by the marginal product of 
labour MPL. Marginal utility MU could be viewed as a function of the stochastic 
taste shift parameter (as a source of epsilon private). MU can also be attributed to 
taste shocks, such as a change in preferences for higher home production or leisure 
preferences. It can also work as an outside option, such as people choosing to work 
in the grey economy or to receive unemployment benefits. When ..... equals one, the 
model denotes perfect competition and when it equals zero, wage equals marginal 
disutility of labour or an outside option, such as unemployment benefits or MPL 
generated in the grey economy. In the search and matching frictions model, gamma 
would equal 0.5.
 In a perfect competition model, wage, marginal product of labour and  marginal 
utility of labour would be equal. In union and search models, however, wage would 
differ from either MPL or MU. Furthermore, the models of monopsonies and 
125A. VASILEV, H. MANOLOVA , South-Eastern Europe Journal of Economics 1 (2019) 91-127
 unions could account for the lower wages in the private sector if the reverse  causality 
were true, i.e. if the public sector was the wage leader. However, since  private wage 
 changes lead to public wage changes, the model becomes less  plausible. Next, 
 going back of the IRFs, we concluded that shocks in CPI do not affect either wage 
in  nominal terms. Additionally, wages in Bulgaria change frequently as  compared 
to the rigid model of efficiency wages. Therefore, the models of both  efficiency 
 wages and a minimum wage as an efficiency one cannot fully explain the findings 
 because of the weak price-wage link. However, the efficiency wage and search and 
 matching frictions models still capture business cycles better than the other models, 
as  documented by Vasilev (2016) and Vasilev (2017). 
Public Sector
What follows are some possible theories that explain the consistently higher 
wages in the public sector. The discussion in section 3 pointed at some privileges 
when  working in the public sector, such as having state-financed employee  social 
 contributions, higher after-tax income, due to government payment towards 
 pension, over-representation of women because of the contrary happening in the 
private sector, etc. The public sector’s objective can be to maximise employment, due 
to social considerations, or gain more votes through public employment. As there 
are not as many theories that could help explain our findings about the public sector, 
we took the private sector models and will now look at them from the public sector 
aspect. However, there is no best model to be selected in the case of the public sector.
 In the government sector there is no profit motive, so perfect competition is not 
a good approximation to the problem of pricing labour in the public sector.
Unions and a single buyer of labour, i.e. the government
The government is a single employer of labour that determines public sector wages 
according to the government budget constraint. Furthermore, since some jobs exist 
exclusively in the public sector, the government is a single employer, or  monopsonist 
that exclusively sets wages, as, for example, in the case of the railway (BDZ), the 
police, etc. As documented by Borjas (2013), unions in the public bargain for higher 
wages and better working conditions generally have more power than in the  private 
sector, since they are not restricted by profit-maximisation. However, as union  power 
is not as strong as it used to be, this model can be disregarded as less  explanatory 
than others.
Search and Matching
Search theory suggests that people with the same abilities may often end up at 
 differently paid jobs in the process of matching, due to, for example, favouritism, 
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 political considerations or information asymmetries. The model could explain the 
wage premium in the public sector. However, public sector employees can also be 
viewed as risk averse, since government positions are relatively secure compared to 
those in the private sector. Working in the government sector can also be an occupa-
tional choice if people find it more rewarding to work for the public good or for their 
country. Government employees are also less likely to change positions  frequently 
or to quit their jobs, so the process of search and matching occurs less often, if not 
only once, as opposed to the frequency of job changes in the private sector. We 
 conclude that search and matching frictions do not explain the labour market as 
well as in the private sector.
Efficiency Wages
The efficiency wage model is a possible explanation for the wage premium of the 
public sector. Furthermore, the government includes a rent allowance in wages 
to establish not only loyalty from its employees, but also a reputation as a good 
 employer. Moreover, the public sector tends to attract people with higher education 
or those with advanced qualifications, which may account for their higher wages. 
Besides, employees tend to have more experience than their counterparts in the 
private sector and, in general, have higher long-term benefits compared to the quick 
money incentive in the private sector. The additional rent allowance that govern-
ment employees receive is de facto an efficiency wage shared between employees and 
the government.
Minimum Wages
The official Bulgarian minimum wage will reach BGN460 in 2017; one reason for 
its continuous increase for the past several years is the government’s attempt to fight 
the increasing percentage of the grey economy. Friedrich Schneider finds that the 
percentage of grey economy for 2015 is 30.6%, a figure that has increased in the 
last year. The Institute for Market Economics (IME) reports in 2015 that, for every 
100 BGN the minimum wage grows, 1.4% decline of employment follows. However, 
as our findings indicate, the minimum wage is not an effective tool or a sufficient 
model, not only because it introduces unemployment, but also because it fails to 
reduce the percentage of the grey economy. 
Political Economy Factors
As noted in Section 3, Rose (1985) points out that public sector workers are also 
voters and are often affiliated with a particular party in order to be patronised by 
it. Public wages and, in this case, minimum wages can be increased prior to an 
 election to encourage people to vote for a particular party. This would also explain 
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discrimination between workers with similar abilities and characteristics, as well as 
the  higher public wage. There is also a theory, known as Parkinson’s law (Parkinson, 
1955), that bureaucracy self-breeds and creates an increasingly complicated bureau-
cratic  system in order to hire more people (subordinates). This theory might explain 
the ever-growing and larger public employment, as well as the wage  premium in the 
presence of political economy in Bulgaria. However, the cycle hierarchy described 
is mitigated by having finite finances for wages coming from the private sector 
in the form of taxation. This also means that public employment is a function of 
what  happens in the private sector and is, thereby, logically following private wage 
 changes.
 Overall, these theories are in line with the observed IRFs, which show that  private 
wage is the driver and that public wages respond to changes in private wages.
